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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2339 
_____________ 
 
LANA L. SCHRODER,  
                                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 3-09-cv-00792) 
District Judge: Honorable Edwin Kosik 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
November 15, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges and RESTANI,
*
 Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 18, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________
                                              
*
 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International 
Trade, sitting by designation.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Lana Schroder appeals from the District Court’s Decision and Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of her employer, the Pleasant Valley School District 
and dismissing her federal race, gender and national origin discrimination claims.  We 
will affirm.   
I.  
As we write solely for the parties, we discuss only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  
Lana Schroder, who is a half-Japanese, half-Caucasian female, worked as a 
substitute bus aide for the Pleasant Valley School District.  A substitute bus aide is a 
person who is called in to replace permanent or part-time bus aides who are unavailable.  
They do not have seniority and are at-will employees.  The substitute is on-call and does 
not work a regular schedule.  Schroder was hired in October 2005 and worked somewhat 
regularly for a year.  She was evaluated twice and both times she received excellent 
marks for her performance but “needs improvement” on her reliability.  Her second 
evaluation noted that she needed to be more consistent in reporting to work. Her 
immediate supervisors also testified that when she showed up, she was good at her job 
but that she was unreliable and would “frequently” call in at the last minute and not show 
up for work.  After her first evaluation, she wrote to her supervisor and explained that she 
was frequently absent because of doctor’s appointments resulting from an earlier car 
accident.  In November 2006, she showed up for work, without being called in, and was 
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told to go home because there was no work for her at that time.  She has not been called 
into work since then.  Around the same time, the School District hired three new 
substitutes, all white, and at least one of them was given a permanent position.   
Schroder wrote to Dr. Frank Pullo, the Superintendent of the School District, to 
inquire why she was taken off the bus aid schedule.  Dr. Pullo responded that she was 
still listed as an active substitute and that perhaps she received less work because they 
had hired a number of other bus aides.  After exhausting her administrative remedies, 
Schroder filed suit in district court.  This appeal followed.
1
  
II. 
 Schroder puts forth two theories of discrimination, specifically a pretext theory 
and a mixed motive theory.   
As she offers no direct evidence of discrimination, Schroder’s pretext theory is 
analyzed under the familiar McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis.  Sheridan v. 
E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
Schroder bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).  Then, the burden of 
production shifts to the school to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact” and thus “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is a genuine issue when there is 
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable jury returning a verdict in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We view the record in the light most favorable to Schroder—the 
nonmoving party. Id. 
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decision.  Id.  Finally, the burden of production returns to Schroder to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that this rationale is pretextual by submitting evidence 
which “1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the 
defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a 
fabrication; or 2) allow the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not 
a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.”  Id. at 762.  
Schroder must do more than demonstrate that Pleasant Valley made a wrong or mistaken 
decision, rather she must show “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s explanation that allow a reasonable 
factfinder to believe that the employer did not truly act for the asserted reason.  Id. at 765. 
Assuming that Schroder has established a prima facie case, the School District has 
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to give Schroder a 
permanent bus run and more substitute assignments.  Specifically, the School District 
asserts that Schroder received less work and was not given a permanent bus run because 
she was unreliable.  A substitute is someone who is frequently called in at the last minute 
and thus reliability can be an especially important factor in determining whether to 
continue to call someone in for work.  Schroder does not dispute that the School District 
took issue with her reliability throughout the entire course of her employment.   
Schroder has failed to present any evidence that demonstrates that this rationale 
was pretextual.  Nothing in the record indicates that these reasons are fabrications.  In 
fact, Schroder, herself, wrote a letter to the School District after her first evaluation to 
explain her frequent absences.  Further, Dr. Pullo’s letter alone does not present an 
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inconsistency that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the School 
District did not act for the reasons stated but instead for impermissible discriminatory 
reasons.  As substitute bus aides do not acquire seniority, the fact that the pool of 
potential substitutes increased would explain why Schroder was called in less, especially 
if Schroder was considered unreliable.  Ultimately, there is no evidence in this record that 
her race, gender or national origin played any role in any alleged adverse employment 
decision.  Thus, summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of the School 
District.  
For similar reasons, Schroder’s mixed-motive theory fails.  Under such a theory, a 
plaintiff need only show that her race, gender or national origin was a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment action.  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).  “The essence of a mixed-motive theory is the 
recognition that there may be a legitimate reason, as well as a prohibited reason, for the 
adverse employment action.”  Id. at 215.  As Schroder has not introduced any evidence 
that her race, gender or national origin played any part in her alleged adverse 
employment action, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in the School 
District’s favor.   
III.  
 The District Court’s Decision and Order will be affirmed.   
